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Value Relevance of Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the impact of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure by companies around the world on market value. Using a large sample of non-financial 
companies listed in 38 countries during the period 2008–2012, we test for value relevance by 
employing the modified version of the Ohlson (1995) model developed by Collins, Maydew, and 
Weiss (1997). We find support for the value relevance of disclosure of ESG both in aggregate form and 
for its individual components. These findings support the expectation of disclosure theory that 
disclosure of relevant information (such as ESG) has a positive impact on value. The results are robust 
to several alternative specifications. Consistent with the finance literature on the impact of legal origin 
(La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 2006; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 
2000, 2002), the results for ESG disclosure are stronger in common-law countries. Our results provide 
new evidence for researchers, investors, and policy makers of the value relevance of ESG disclosure in 
a broad international setting. The evidence shows that globally investors benefit from the disclosure of 
both aggregate ESG and the individual factors and this supports regulators in pushing companies to 
provide additional ESG information. 
Keywords: Value relevance, non-financial information, ESG. 
Data availability: The data are available from public sources identified in the text. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been increasing use of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) 
information by participants in capital markets. This supports the argument that traditional financial 
information has limited usefulness to investors as it provides only historical-oriented information on 
a narrow financial base that is insufficient to assess a company's ability to generate future profits 
(Lev & Zarowin, 1999). Therefore the objective for this study is to explore the extent to which non-
financial information, such as that provided by ESG disclosure, does usefully supplement the 
traditional financial information.  
The role of ESG information in business has undergone many changes over the course of history. 
Eccles and Viviers (2011), for example, report that ESG factors have been discussed in the 
academic literature for more than 35 years. However, it is apparent that the role of ESG disclosure 
has changed over time. In past decades, many have claimed that businesses have no social 
responsibilities and therefore they should not devote company resources to engaging in socially 
responsible activities (Friedman, 2007; Karnani, 2010; Reich, 2008) and because such activities do 
not provide a payoff (Telle, 2006), some go further and claim it is costly to shareholder value 
(e.g.Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995; Walley & Whitehead, 1994). However, more recently, 
commonly-held views have swung in the opposite direction, actively encouraged by public 
expectations and regulatory pressure, to the point where sustainability issues have assumed a central 
role in the management of business (Marsat & Williams, 2011; Panwar, Rinne, Hansen, & Juslin, 
2006). The scope of concern has also enlarged somewhat (Mahmoudian, Nazari, & Herremans, 
2012). To remain acceptable to society today, it appears that companies have to be accountable to a 
wider array of interests. As a result, in carrying out their activities, firms must desist from activities 
such as damaging the environment, harming the health of consumers, violating the rights of 
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employees, and should have concern for sustainability and their overall contribution to social 
welfare (Cruz & Wakolbinger, 2008). 
Despite this current ideal view of the business-society relationship, the extent to which markets 
actually give favourable recognition to companies that operate in this manner remains an open 
question. Many studies have considered these issues, including under different labels such as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate social performance (CSP), socially responsible 
investment (SRI) and others (Gillan, Hartzell, Koch, & Starks, 2010). Nevertheless, research to date 
on the actual relevance of ESG information to the markets is still in the early stage of investigation. 
The research on the effects of ESG disclosure on the market value of companies has largely been 
limited to developed countries such as the US (Jo & Na, 2012; Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 
2010), Canada (Cormier, Magnan, & Morard, 1993), Australia (Balatbat, Siew, & Carmichael, 
2012), Finland (Schadewitz & Niskala, 2010), Sweden  (Semenova, Hassel, & Nilsson, 2009) and 
regions such as the European Union  (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2013; Länsilahti, 2012). 
Furthermore, comparative international studies have been confined to addressing specific ESG 
factors such as corporate governance (Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011); and 
have used databases that included only a small proportion of global companies (Xiao, Faff, 
Gharghori, & Lee, 2013). Other international studies have focused on only one of the components 
of market value: the cost of capital (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Fulton, Kahn, & Sharples, 
2012; Wang & Huang, 2013), and have used different classifications of ESG rating. The results 
have been mixed to a degree that calls for further investigation (Bird, Hall, Momentè, & Reggiani, 
2007; Marsat & Williams, 2011), in particular on the effect of ESG disclosure on market value 
(reflecting both risk and cash flow) of companies globally.  
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This study addresses the gap by examining the value relevance of disclosure of ESG factors. 
Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens (2008) state that ESG information is composed of a variety of 
different types of information and the effect of each of these factors on shareholder value is also 
diverse. Similar to Humphrey, Lee, and Shen (2012), this study therefore examines both the 
aggregate and individual ESG factors to provide a more comprehensive assessment. However, in 
contrast to  Humphrey et al. (2012) who investigated the impact of ESG on financial performance 
of UK firms, our study investigates the effect of ESG disclosure on the market value of firms 
globally. Specifically, the present study assesses the effects of disclosure of aggregate ESG and 
individual factors on the stock price of companies globally. 
We use a large sample of non-financial companies listed in 38 countries during the period 2008–
2012, to investigate the value relevance of ESG disclosure worldwide. Bloomberg disclosure scores 
are used as the measure of ESG disclosure, which is predominantly disclosed on a voluntary basis. 
The book value/earnings model developed by Collins et al. (1997) from the Ohlson (1995) model is 
employed to assess value relevance. We find strong evidence that both aggregate ESG and the 
individual factors have significant positive associations with market value. The results are robust to 
several alternative tests. These findings support the expectation of disclosure theory that companies 
disclosing ESG information are valued higher (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001).  
This paper contributes to our understanding of the benefits of ESG disclosure in three ways. First 
we extend previous studies in terms of country coverage. Previous studies such as (Cormier et al., 
1993; Plumlee et al., 2010) have focused on single countries, while previous international studies 
such as Länsilahti (2012) have focused only on the European region. Second, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the issues globally by using the ESG disclosure 
scores provided by Bloomberg. This is important as the Bloomberg data is comprehensive and 
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standardised as it is collected using a consistent methodology across national boundaries.  Third, we 
control for common and code law institutional factors, which reduces the potential for 
misspecification errors arising from differences in the disclosure regimes.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section two describes ESG rankings and databases. 
Section three presents the theoretical framework concerning the value relevance of the disclosure of 
both aggregate ESG and the individual factors. Section four describes the models, the data and the 
variables employed. Section five presents the empirical results and the analysis of the results. 
Section six concludes the paper and outlines the contributions, and limitations of the study. 
II. ESG RANKINGS AND DATABASES 
Supply on ESG information emerged during the late 1990s (Novethic Research, 2011). Since then 
the field has continued to grow with an increasing number of agencies providing ESG rankings. 
Today, the ESG information market is dynamic and characterised by a number of institutions 
offering a diversified range of products and services, with an increasingly broad geographic 
coverage – built up through partnerships and acquisitions. The ESG ranking agencies can be 
categorised into two groups: the agencies with limited geographic coverage, and the agencies that 
operate on a global scale. This section will focus primarily on the latter group. Currently there are 
three leading international financial service agencies, namely Bloomberg
1
, MSCI
2
 and Thomson 
Reuters
3
  (Novethic Research, 2013). All three provide integrated ESG scores. Due to the 
                                               
1 In 2009, Bloomberg acquired New Energy Finance, a UK-based information provider on renewable energy and the 
carbon market (Novethic Research, 2013). This resulted in an enlarged number of indicators being considered in 
determination of ESG scores. 
2MSCI acquired RiskMetrics in 2010 (MSCI, 2010). RiskMetrics previously acquired two leading ESG research firms, 
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors and KLD Research & Analytics that rate ESG disclosure scores. 
3 Thomson Reuters acquired Asset4, a 2003 born Swiss-based ESG data provider in 2009 (Integrity Research 
Associates, 2009). 
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unavailability of a common framework as a basis for ESG ratings, each agency uses its own scoring 
system even though the agencies refer to uniform international guidelines such as the Global 
Responsible Initiative (GRI), the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention, the United 
Nations (UN) Global Compact, the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), the Kyoto 
Protocol and other international sustainability frameworks. The guidelines are usually used by the 
agencies as a norm base in the analysis of ESG issues. This study, however, focuses on the 
Bloomberg database as the source of our ESG data. 
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/, provides environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
information in the form of disclosure scores that range from 0.1 to 100 and are tailored according to 
country, industrial sector, and other criteria. Being in the form of a score enables comparison of 
disclosure levels across companies, with a high score indicating a higher level of disclosure. There 
are separate scores for environmental, social, and governance disclosure and also an overall 
integrated score. 
Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure scores reflect three sources of information. First, Bloomberg gathers 
public ESG information released by the companies, such as in CSR reports, annual reports, or 
websites, which are mostly voluntary disclosures. Second, Bloomberg uses data provided by other 
reliable public sources such as the carbon disclosure project (CDP). Third, Bloomberg also sends 
questionnaires to the companies being rated in order to obtain additional ESG information. The 
process of construction of the indices is summarised by Bloomberg as follows: 
Bloomberg ESG data is collected from company-sourced filings such as 
Corporate Social Responsibility reports, annual reports, company websites and a 
proprietary Bloomberg survey that requests corporate data directly. Information 
compiled by Bloomberg analysts then examined, compared and classified into one 
of the ESG component. All of these data is also linked to the sources of 
information, which allows the users to verify the data. (Bloomberg, 2012). 
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The Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores are based on the GRI framework but the scoring system is 
not disclosed by Bloomberg as it is considered proprietary to Bloomberg
4
.  
Only a small number of studies have been published to date that make use of the Bloomberg ESG 
disclosure scores. Cheung and Mak (2010) investigated the relationship between CSR disclosure 
(measured by Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure scores) and financial performance (ROA, ROE, and 
market return) of 57 international commercial banks in 18 countries, primarily European and from 
North America. The findings suggest that ESG disclosure has a neutral (or no definitive) impact on 
the three financial performance measures. Eccles, Krzus, and Serafeim (2011) investigated the 
degree of investor interest in NFI (as measured by the number of hits on the Bloomberg search tool 
for ESG disclosure scores) and found a high level of market interest in ESG disclosure scores. 
Lapinskienė and Tvaronavičienė (2009) investigated the significant drivers affecting ESG 
disclosure (as measured by the ESG disclosure scores) in selected European Union countries from 
2006-2010 and found positive coefficients for ROA and firm size. Mahmoudian et al. (2012) 
examined the impact of organisational accountability controls on voluntary ESG disclosure and 
found that the various levels of control determine the willingness for voluntarily providing ESG 
disclosure.  
There have been studies that have employed various other sources of ESG data including Thomson 
Reuters/Asset4  (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010), MSCI/KLD (Bird et al., 2007; Marsat & Williams, 
2011), Domini Social Index (Evans & Peiris, 2010), Corporate Monitor (CAER) or EIRIS (Balatbat 
                                               
4 Based on email reply from Bloomberg ESG section, Bloomberg currently captures more than 300 indicators and the 
number of indicators are increased every year. “To calculate ESG disclosure score, Bloomberg is taking E, S and G 
indicators with different weighting. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, with data such as GHG carrying 
greater weight than the other industry specific or market specific fields. So the formula is not directly adding the E, S 
and G components together”. 
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et al., 2012), Governance Metrics International (GMI) (Galbreath, 2013) and Sustainability Asset 
Management Group GmbH (SAM)
5
 (Humphrey et al., 2012). 
III. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section reviews the existing literature and develops the hypotheses for the study. Four types of 
disclosure affecting market value are considered in this study, namely environmental factors (E), 
social factors (S), governance factors (G), and the aggregate of these factors, environmental, social 
and governance (ESG). Each of these types is considered in turn, but first, we examine briefly the 
position of the present study in the disclosure literature. 
In a broader context, this study relates to studies in the disclosure theory literature. Disclosure 
theory suggests that companies are more likely to disclose more information for a number of 
functional reasons. Researchers usually look at this motivation under two different perspectives: 
normative and positive perspectives. Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari (2008) classify the 
perspectives into socio political theory and economics based theory. 
In socio political theory (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Lindblom, 1994; 
Patten, 2002), the company is seen as being pressured by the business environment to disclose 
certain information because of stakeholder demand, legitimacy status, or other political purposes. 
The cost of such disclosure may not necessarily bring financial benefits to the company as it is not 
motivated purely by financial reasons. Therefore, the theory does not provide a strong justification 
for disclosure to have an impact on firm value (Clarkson, Li, & Richardson, 2004). 
                                               
5 SAM is a sustainability analysis that provides ESG research used to form the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. SAM 
assesses more than 1000 companies around the world annually. 
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The economics based theory suggests that companies that disclose more information will have self-
classified as a superior type of business, which is hard to copy by potentially inferior types of 
businesses, because of the proprietary cost of disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2004). Proprietary cost, on 
the one hand, provides an entry barrier to non-disclosing firms, and on the other hand, provides 
advantages to disclosing firms by sending a positive signal to investors. Therefore, the theory 
predicts a positive relationship between disclosure and market value. 
Disclosure, in the context of economics based theory, is expected to result in a number of economic 
consequences that ultimately impact on market value. The value impact can come from a number of 
sources. From the company perspective, disclosure provides a means of communication between 
the company and relevant stakeholders, which minimises the principal-agent problem considered in 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
6
. From the perspective of investors, disclosure provides 
summarised information about the potential future risks and opportunities of the company. Better 
informed investors, thus, have lower information risk  (Healy & Palepu, 2001). The risks may 
include adverse selection, misevaluation, litigation, reputation, and legal. Disclosure mitigates these 
risks thus giving greater certainty to equity (and debt) investors. In general, disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry, thus reducing agency conflicts and the cost of equity capital (Artiach & 
Clarkson, 2011; Botosan, 1997, 2000; Chen, Chen, & Su, 2001; Derwall & Verwijmeren, 2007; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004; Ng & Rezaee, 2012). 
                                               
6 Agency theory holds the view that the relationship among the individuals in an organisation is based on an agreement, 
where the owners of capital (the principals) hire and assign incentive-motivated management (the agent) to run the 
organisation on the principal’s behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the agreement serves to constrain management 
from pursuing their own interests which may diverge from the interest of the principals. With this notion, companies are 
the locus and nexus of many contractual types of relationships among internal and external members (Wolk & Tearney, 
1997). 
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Considering the above discussion, this study, proposes two theoretical underpinnings for the 
prediction that NFI disclosure links to market value. First, the information asymmetry. NFI reduces 
information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970) and therefore market participants will value more highly 
companies that have a higher level of NFI disclosure. Information asymmetry for a public company 
arises from the separation of ownership and control between management and shareholders. This 
leads to higher level of non-diversifiable risks but this can be reduced by disclosure of relevant 
information (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Research shows 
that for extreme information asymmetry, uninformed investors may have such concerns about the 
market price being too high or too low that they become unwilling to trade (Glosten & Milgrom, 
1985). Greater disclosure reduces the uncertainty regarding the value of the company, and thus 
increases the level of investor confidence. 
The second underpinning theory derives from the principal-agent problem. In this perspective, 
increased disclosure gives transparency on how the company is managed and hence builds better 
mutual understanding between investors and management. This may ultimately solve the principal-
agent problem. Consequently, market participants will value companies higher with a higher level 
of NFI disclosure. 
Given the need to create cost-effective management, agency theory predicts that organisations will 
seek to introduce mechanisms that align the interests of management with those of the principals to 
ensure that management actions benefit both them and the organisation. Some of these methods will 
include internal mechanisms such as compensation agreements tied to accounting profits to create 
binding relationships between managers and stakeholders (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Others are 
market-wide mechanisms; for example, through creating a sense of trust between the parties 
concerned. The latter especially can be achieved by building better communication with 
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stakeholders to signal good corporate management through good disclosure practice. Research 
suggests that the agency conflicts between company management and outside investors stemming 
from information asymmetry and agency conflicts can be mitigated by corporate disclosures 
(Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007).  
This study is also located among the studies on the economic consequences of non-financial 
information disclosure, in particular the disclosure of ESG factors. The term sustainability has 
developed momentum in the last few decades, driven by changes in the business environment along 
with institutional and regulatory pressures. As a result sustainability factors have become a key 
issue for corporate governance (Panwar et al., 2006). With the initiatives taken worldwide in 
sustainability reporting, the trend is for increasing supply of this type of non-financial information 
(Ball & Grubnic, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2011; Cohen, 
Holder-Webb, Nath, & Wood, 2011; Eva, Lawrence, Roper, & Haar, 2011; King & Lenox, 2001). 
Sustainability information (including CSR, SRI, and others) in the capital market are commonly 
measured by and referred to as ESG factors, as the measures that is considered by researchers as 
best understood and most utilised as corporate sustainability metrics (Fulton et al., 2012). 
The term ESG was first used in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2004 and 
has since became popular among investment communities associated with socially responsible 
investment (Eccles & Viviers, 2011; Fulton et al., 2012; Lapinskienė & Tvaronavičienė, 2012). 
Researchers have increasingly used the term ESG to refer to a broad set of corporate activities 
(Derwall, 2007). 
Other related terms are also used; most notably, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
sustainability (Eccles & Viviers, 2011). Others, such as integrated reporting have also gained 
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prominence in recent years (Robeco & Eccles, 2014). In many studies these terms are used 
interchangeably. For example, CSR and sustainability are used interchangeably in Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011); risk compliance and governance (RCG), integrated reporting, and sustainability reporting in 
Ng and Rezaee (2012); sustainable investing, ethical investing, and Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI), are used interchangeably with CSR (Derwall, 2007). Nevertheless, the term ESG 
has become prominent in financial markets (Xiao et al., 2013) and mainstream in analytic tools  
(Bogoslaw, 2014). 
The importance of ESG information for capital markets is gaining increased recognition. Major 
international bodies
7
 have recently been involved in a global dialogue resulting in five stock 
exchanges and a large number of global investors declaring support for ESG practices (White, 
2012). A number of capital market regulators such as in Malaysia, Thailand, China, Taiwan, and 
India have encouraged companies to provide better transparency through disclosure of related ESG 
factors (World Federation of Exchanges, 2009). In South Africa, following the King reports
8
, it has 
become mandatory for companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to provide integrated 
sustainability reports (Ackers, 2009; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2011). The King report requirement is in 
line with the GRI report (Sustainability partners inc, 2014) and ESG factors. This capital market 
recognition of ESG has motivated information services, such as Bloomberg, MSCI, and Thomson 
Reuters, to provide ESG ratings (Humphrey et al., 2012; Länsilahti, 2012). 
                                               
7The international bodies include: The Global Compact; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD); United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN-PRI); and the United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative UNEP FI). 
8 King Committee on Corporate Governance South Africa has issued three reports on corporate governance: in 1994 
(King I), 2002 (King II), and 2009 (King III), which has resulted in all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange being required to comply with the disclosure requirements or explain the reasons for non-compliance. 
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Similar to other sustainability measures, there is no specific definition for ESG. In its widest sense, 
ESG is a generic term for a subset of non-financial indicators used in capital markets to evaluate 
corporate sustainability. Balancing the three ESG elements is described as sustainable measures that 
support sustainable development, which is broadly defined as development that conserves natural 
resources so as to ensure that meeting the needs of the present does not compromise the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs. ESG information reflects the responsible corporate practices 
that aim to deliver higher risk-adjusted financial returns (Eccles & Viviers, 2011) and, thus, ESG 
summarises the additional information employed by investors to assess the risks and opportunities 
relating to corporate social responsibility  (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). 
Embracing ESG policies entails both costs and benefits for the companies concerned. In terms of 
complying with the ESG agenda, companies are restricted with regard to certain activities. They are 
discouraged, for instance, from doing business with companies that abuse workers or exploit 
children. Companies may incur additional costs to maintain green operations or to invest in energy-
efficient machinery. On the other hand, companies may also benefit from compliance by creating a 
strong positive reputation and enhancing brand loyalty, both of which help to ensure long-term 
survival. On balance, it is increasingly thought that favourable ESG performance contributes to 
financial performance, and for this reason ESG information in progressively being integrated into 
the process of investment analysis and decision-making (UNEP, 2007). 
Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest that the literature on environmental accounting research can be 
classified into three groups: the value relevance of environmental information, the determinants of 
environmental disclosure, and the relationship of environmental disclosure to company 
performance. This study fits in the first category, with examination of the impact of both the 
aggregate ESG disclosure and each of the individual factors on market value.  
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In the following sub-sections we will demonstrate the ways in which ESG information can affect 
the value of the company. As valuation theory suggests, the price investors are willing to pay for the 
shares of a company is mainly driven by the expected profitability of the company, the cost of 
capital, and the potential of growth in the future (Charles & David, 2006). These three sub-
components impact directly or indirectly on company’s value and can enter the company through 
several channels to the individual ESG factors below.  We attempt to review the literature with 
specific relevance to the aggregate and the individual ESG factors but we of course recognise that 
many of the studies quoted cover more than just one of the individual ESG factors or focus on just 
the aggregate. 
Environmental disclosure and market value 
Environmental factors are perhaps the most researched of the three elements of ESG. This is not 
surprising as the steady deterioration of some aspects of the environment has put increasing 
pressure on companies, by regulators, peers, and society as a whole to adopt sustainable operations. 
However, while the majority of studies on the effects of the disclosure of environmental factors on 
market value of companies have reported a positive relationship (Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; 
Clarkson, Fang, Li, & Richardson, 2013; Clarkson et al., 2004; Connors & Silva-Gao, 2008; 
Cormier & Magnan, 1997; Plumlee et al., 2010), some studies have reported the relationship to be 
either neutral or negative (Elshahat, 2010; RARE Infrastructure & Sustainalytics, 2013). 
Hassel, Nilsson, and Nyquist (2005) classify this type of research into two schools. First the 
competitive advantage school, which claims that an environmental effort improves investor’s 
financial returns because of the increased competitive advantage. Second, the cost-concerned 
school, which argues that a company’s disclosure of environmental information lowers market 
value because increased costs depress profits.  
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The first of these schools is generally based on the perceived downstream effects of a good 
reputation created by transparency and responsiveness to public demands. Environmental disclosure 
is considered to increase transparency which in turn creates a positive profile for the company 
(Azzone, Manzini, & Noci, 1998). Likewise, environmental disclosure is reported to enhance a 
firm’s competitiveness due to the stimulus it provides for product innovation (Brännlund & 
Lundgren, 2009; Porter & Linde, 1995). This leads to the perception that the company is complying 
with environmental regulation and anticipating future obligations (Porter & Linde, 1995). Cutting 
pollution levels could potentially reduce future costs and environmental liabilities (Aerts, Cormier, 
& Magnan, 2007; Cormier et al., 1993; Porter & Linde, 1995). For example, Blacconiere and Patten 
(1994) examined the market reactions to a chemical company after a chemical leak in Bhopal, India 
in 1984, which resulted in 4,000 deaths and 200,000 injuries. Evidence suggests that firms with 
extensive environmental disclosure prior to the disaster experienced a less adverse reaction than did 
firms with less environmental disclosure; this is interpreted by the authors as indicating that the 
disclosure is assessed by investors as a positive sign of firms’ managing future regulatory costs. 
Using US data, Plumlee et al. (2010) examined the effect of quality (hard/soft type and positive/ 
neutral/negative in nature) of voluntary corporate environmental disclosure on each of the 
components of company value: the expected future cash flows and cost of equity capital. They 
conclude that improved quality of voluntary environmental disclosures relates to both components 
of firm value. 
Similarly, in the Australian context, Bachoo, Tan, and Wilson (2013) investigated the relationship 
between quality sustainability reporting and firm value, through either (or both) cost of capital and 
expected future performance effects. They also document that quality sustainability reporting 
reduces the cost of equity capital and improves expected future performance. 
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There are also studies that improved evidence on the value relevance of environmental disclosure 
across time. Cormier et al. (1993) examined the relationship between pollution indices and the stock 
market value of Canadian companies and found a weak association. This weak relationship was 
interpreted by the authors as a signal that investors regard the pollution index as providing 
information on environmental liabilities. In a later study Cormier and Magnan (1997) showed that 
poor environmental performance has a negative impact on market value, which is interpreted by 
investors as implicitly initiating environmental liabilities. The results of the 1997 study showed a 
stronger association compared to the 1993 study; this improvement could be a result of the tighter 
regulations and better awareness investors of ESG issues. This is supported by Bird et al. (2007) 
who documented increasing market support for CSR information over recent years, characterised by 
the diversity of issues that increasingly attract the attention of investors. 
Cormier and Magnan (2007) investigated the mediating impact of environmental disclosure on the 
relationship between company valuation and earnings in three countries – Germany, Canada, and 
France – to assess the impact of country-specific environmental reporting. They found a moderating 
effect of environmental disclosure on the stock market value of German firms, but did not find a 
significant influence for Canadian and French companies. The mixed results were interpreted by the 
authors as indicating that institutional context influences the effect of the disclosure on value. 
The second of the schools noted above, the cost-concern school, appears to have rather less support 
in the literature. Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006) have suggested that environmental efforts 
increase costs and are, therefore, destroyers of shareholder value. Similarly Cheung and Mak (2010) 
report that the increased level of CSR disclosure can improve a firm’s credibility, but it can also add 
to costs and thus reduce firms’ profit. These studies both support the conclusions of the early study 
by Hughes (2000) who found a negative relationship between firm value and sulphur dioxide 
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emissions. Similarly with  Elshahat (2010), the results of those studies suggest that environmental 
problems are more likely to be associated with an increase in the value of the company rather than 
the strengths of the environment. 
However, some doubt exists concerning the exact nature of the differences between the two schools 
of thought. It has been argued, for instance, that the divergence of results arises not so much from 
actual differences as from differences in research methodology. For instance, UNEP (2007) believes 
that Brammer, et al.’s results were affected by the scoring system used for the environmental 
dimension and the length of the period over which the study was conducted. More specifically, 
UNEP noted that Brammer, et al.’s results cannot be reconciled with those from a similar but 
broader study by Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk (2005) which indicated that companies 
with active environmental focus had superior shareholder returns. Cheung and Mak (2010) have 
suggested that the period over which their study was conducted could have affected the results. 
Additionally, Patten (2002) suggests that the lack of significant results in previous studies may be 
due to the lack of control for other factors such as sample selection and the measure of 
environmental performance. Finally, it is apparent that some empirical measures are subject to 
significant measurement errors (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 1999). Examples include NFI measures of 
customer satisfaction, brand, and human capital measures that rely on informal survey data, and 
subjective conceptual frameworks (Wyatt, 2008). The inconclusive findings may also have been the 
result of different disclosure instruments measuring different types of disclosure. 
Overall then, and despite the existence of empirical findings to the contrary, it would appear that the 
literature supports the existence of a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and the 
market value of firms. This is consistent with positive theory which predicts a value enhancing 
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impact of disclosure of ESG on market value through reduction of information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts. The first hypothesis therefore is: 
H1: Environmental disclosure is positively associated with company market value. 
Social disclosure and market value 
Disclosure has the potential to provide transparency and disseminate information, therefore 
reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and investors. Therefore, 
agency theory supports a positive relationship between social disclosure and market value if, 
indeed, social disclosure is relevant to investors. Companies are able to maintain efficiency through 
sustainable relationships between managers and investors, which will increase their competitiveness 
by avoiding agency costs. Hillman and Keim (2001) state that good relationships among key 
stakeholders increase intangible value, which contributes to market returns. El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
suggest that US firms that make clear efforts to improve employee welfare have a lower cost of 
equity capital.  
Servaes and Tamayo (2013) studied whether CSR activities are valued higher for more consumer-
aware firms and whether this impact is weaker for firms with a poor prior reputation for responsible 
behaviour. The findings suggest that corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm value are 
positively related for firms with high customer awareness, as measured by advertising expenditures, 
and the relationship become weaker (either negative or insignificant) for low awareness firms. This 
effect is much stronger (reversed) for firms with a poor prior reputation. This evidence indicates 
that CSR activities improve firm value, but only under certain conditions.  
Richardson and Welker (2001) investigated the relationship between financial and social 
disclosures and cost of equity capital in Canadian companies with year-ends in 1990, 1991, and 
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1992. They documented a significant negative relationship between the costs of equity capital and 
financial disclosure but, contrary to expectation, found a positive relationship with social disclosure. 
However, this positive relationship is weaker in companies with better financial performance. This 
indicates that although CSR disclosure does not directly affect the market value, but it may have a 
mediating effect on market value. The results were interpreted by the authors as reflecting potential 
biases in a social disclosure report; for example, where a disclosure is made by a company for 
promotional purposes, the social disclosure would tend to be more extensive on positive aspects and 
these efforts may inflate costs rather than have financial benefits. Peloza (2009) makes the obvious 
but significant point that the financial impact of metric-bases measuring social engagement is 
highly dependent on the ability of these metrics to capture all of the costs and benefits of each social 
initiative.   
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) tested whether the relationship between CSR and the company's 
market value is mediated by customer satisfaction. Overall, they found that the lower the level of 
customer satisfaction the lower the impact of CSR on market value. This study is in line with that of 
Aaker and Jacobson (2001) who showed that the attitude of customers towards the brand, which is 
built by using innovation and technology in creating product attributes, helps increase market value 
in the future. 
On the other hand, some research findings suggest that increased public relations activity results in 
reduced investment returns (Brammer et al., 2006). That is, the benefits of social initiatives often 
come at the expense of the relatively large resources spent on social engagement (Brammer et al., 
2006). 
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Another view suggests that information users need time to develop awareness of specific measures 
to recognise the actual benefits of each of the ESG components. Edmans (2011) suggests that, 
although there is a positive association between employee satisfaction and stock returns in the long 
run, the stock market still does not fully value intangibles and, consequently, only selected ESG 
factors improve stock returns. Furthermore, Bauer, Otten, and Rad (2006) found that although there 
is no significant overall difference between the risk-adjusted returns of ethical and conventional 
funds, there are differences during certain periods of time. Between 1992 and 1996, the 
conventional funds appear to have outperformed ethical funds, but during the period from 1997 to 
2003, the two investment approaches showed similar performance. The authors conclude that a 
learning period is required before the market is able to truly appreciate ethical screening. This could 
be another explanation for the medium to long-term impact of ESG factors on firm performance, 
and the market price of firms as reported in other studies (Balatbat et al., 2012; CSR Europe, 2003; 
Maier, 2007). 
The inconsistent results of previous studies may also be due to a number of social factors having no 
impact on stakeholders. Hillman and Keim (2001) classified social activities into two components: 
stakeholder management, which has a direct relationship with various stakeholders, (e.g. investor 
relations); and social issue participation which has no direct relationship with the stakeholders, such 
as avoiding involvement with tobacco, alcohol, or gambling industries. The first group is expected 
to have a positive financial impact on shareholder value while the second group is not expected to 
have any impact. Hillman and Keim (2001), therefore, investigated the impact of stakeholder 
management on shareholder value, and as predicted, found that better relationships with stakeholder 
groups leads to an increase in shareholder value.  
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In summary, the evidence from research studies on the impact of social disclosure on market value 
has been mixed. However, increasing awareness among capital market investors of the importance 
of social factors as an indication of potential future risk and return has prompted greater attention to 
these factors. This study predicts, therefore, that social disclosure has a positive impact on value. 
Thus the following hypothesis is proposed. 
H2: Social disclosure is positively associated with company market value.  
Governance disclosure and market value 
Major financial scandals such as Enron and Lehman Brothers have led to demands in many 
countries for reform of corporate governance. A large body of research has developed on the impact 
of governance on value. Consistent with the disclosure hypothesis, the literature linking governance 
measures to firm value suggests that good corporate governance is associated with higher market 
value (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Gompers, Ishii, & 
Metrick, 2003). 
Corporate governance is a broad and diverse concept. It encapsulates all the mechanisms that 
determine the procedure for determining the direction of the firm (Schmidt, 2003). A broad 
definition also indicates a lack of clarity of the concept (Webb, Pollard, & Ridley, 2006). Because 
of its abstract nature, corporate governance is also not easily measured, or compared between 
companies. It is tied to specific organisational contexts as it also involves discretion in selecting 
policies deemed most appropriate for specific circumstances. Therefore, despite the consensus 
among financial communities of the strong benefits of good corporate governance, the findings of 
previous studies have been inconsistent. Some studies suggest a weak to neutral relationship 
between governance attributes and firm market value (Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004). 
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The value impact derives from a number of sources. For example, good corporate governance can 
promote high quality management that improves productivity through enhanced creativity and 
innovation. Good governance also promotes efficiency because it can reduce waste in the 
production process, and through effective monitoring reduce agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders, thus avoiding the costs of conflict (Maher & Andersson, 2000). Companies with 
good governance also enhance shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003).  
The positive relationship between corporate governance disclosure and market value has been found 
in a number of studies (Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006; 
Drobetz, Schillhofer, & Zimmermann, 2004; Klapper & Love, 2004). Agency theory supports this 
results. Beiner et al. (2006) suggest that the positive relationship derived from reduction of agency 
problems has a positive impact on the expected future cash flows. Additionally, Lombardo and 
Pagano (1999) also suggest good corporate governance reduces the cost of monitoring and auditing. 
This is consistent with La Porta et al. (2002) who found that better legal protection for minority 
shareholders reduces investors’ uncertainty about the outlook for corporate profits. 
Researchers have found that both internal and external governance mechanisms have a positive 
relationship with the value of the company (Ammann et al., 2011; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Brown 
& Caylor, 2006; Jo & Harjoto, 2012). The source of value arises either directly, such as from 
reduced cost of capital, or indirectly, such as through companies’ internal improvements in 
employee and product quality that ultimately enhance shareholder value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). 
Ammann et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and 
firm value in companies across 22 developed countries over the period 2003-2007. A set of 64 
individual governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI) plus three 
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self-constructed corporate governance indices were analysed. The findings indicated a strong and 
positive relation between firm-level corporate governance and firm valuation. It was concluded by 
the authors that the benefits of reduced shareholders’ monitoring outweighed the costs of 
implementing corporate governance with the result that returns to investors were higher.  
Jo and Harjoto (2011) examined the effects of governance mechanisms (internal and external) on a 
company decision to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR), and on the market value of 
companies. The study found a positive relationship between CSR engagement and internal and 
external governance. The impact of CSR engagement on market value was also positive, the 
positive impact being stronger for analyst following compared to other governance mechanisms 
such as board leadership, board independence, block holders’ ownership, and institutional 
ownership.  
However, Cremers and Nair (2005) and Brown and Caylor (2006) have reported that not all 
measures of good governance are associated with firm value. This applies especially to factors that 
have not been the subject of extensive study such as an “independent nominating committee”. This 
explanation suggests that public awareness determines whether investors consider these factors to 
be relevant to valuation. Such findings may also be attributed to small sample size, the 
measurement metrics used, or possibly the relatively minor importance of the corporate governance 
factor studied compared to other factors. As suggested by Brown and Caylor (2009), effective 
corporate governance measures require broad measures including both internal and external 
governance mechanisms to enhance the robustness of findings. 
Taken together, the strong support for the positive association between good governance and market 
value and the limitations of some studies – in both the measurement model and the choice of 
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variables, this study predicts a positive relationship between governance and market value. This 
leads to the next hypothesis: 
H3: Governance disclosure is positively associated with company market value.  
ESG disclosure and market value 
Studies have documented that companies with ESG disclosure obtain various kinds of benefits that 
contribute to their market value. These benefits include reduction in the cost of capital (Bachoo et 
al., 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Plumlee et al., 2010; Richardson & Welker, 2001), reduction in the 
cost of debt (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Fulton et al., 2012; Goss & Roberts, 2011; Jung, Herbohn, & 
Clarkson, 2014), and other cost efficiencies, such as waste reduction (Heal, 2005), potential costs 
associated with environmental disasters, financial lawsuits, and consumer boycotts (Marsat & 
Williams, 2011); thus improving the overall expected future return/cash flows (Bachoo et al., 2013; 
Plumlee et al., 2010), which ultimately improve the overall firm value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). 
ESG disclosure can affect firm value through several channels. Companies with ESG policies have 
been reported as having reputation gains, thereby increasing investor confidence; efficient use of 
resources and thus being better able to compete; more highly motivated employees, higher 
productivity, innovation, and new market opportunities. All of these results are favourably rewarded 
by the capital markets (Guenster, Bauer, Derwall, & Koedijk, 2011). The companies may also be 
more likely to have superior management and more capable of running a successful business 
(Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Clarkson et al., 2004). In addition, ESG disclosure increases 
company transparency, thus giving the company a positive profile (Azzone et al., 1998). 
Environmental and social engagement increases profits by reducing the cost of conflict with the 
community, improving relationships with regulators, increasing employee productivity, and 
26 
 
increasing efficiency due to reductions in the amount of waste (Heal, 2005). Investors, in particular 
those who are aware of the advantages of companies that are socially responsible, as listed above, 
are willing to pay a premium for the securities (Richardson & Welker, 2001). Similarly, CSR 
disclosure has been found to increase sell-side analyst forecast accuracy, which could potentially 
improve the liquidity of securities (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012). 
ESG disclosure can also affect firms’ value directly. Bird et al. (2007) investigated the relationship 
between a company’s positive and negative corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and 
equity performance. They used KLD ESG ratings for US companies included in the S&P500 index 
from 1991 to 2003 and focused on five distinct CSR activities separately rather than on a total CSR 
score for each company. Overall, they found that valuation proxies have a positive association with 
diversity, employee, and product strengths, but negatively relate to employee concerns. They 
conclude that CSR engagement does not have negative impact on market value and in fact the value 
impact increased over time, indicating more interest by investors in CSR issues. 
A number of prior studies in the broad areas of ESG (including SRI and CSR), however, have also 
reported negative results. Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008) investigated the impact of ethics 
and good corporate governance on risk-adjusted return of the fund management industry using a 
unique data set consisting of nearly all SRI mutual funds around the world (Europe, North America, 
and Asia-Pacific). They found that the risk-adjusted returns of the average SRI funds in the US, the 
UK, and most continental European and Asia-Pacific countries strongly underperform their Fama-
French-Carhart (FFC) benchmarks. These results indicate that investors pay a price for investing in 
SRI funds. 
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In the context of CSR, Gietl, Göttsche, Habisch, Roloff, and Schauer (2013) investigated the 
influence of the GRI sustainability reporting to market value of non-financial EUROSTOXX 600 
companies and found that there is no significant effect for large and profitable companies, but the 
GRI A+ has a significant negative effect on firm value for smaller or less profitable companies. 
These results indicate the high cost of adopting the GRI A+ for smaller or less profitable 
companies. 
In addition, Marsat and Williams (2011) investigated the relationship between the practices of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and stock price. Using the data from MSCI ESG ratings as a 
measure of CSR practice for 2838 companies around the world from 2005 to 2009, they found a 
significant negative relationship between CSR practices and company market value. This indicates 
that the companies do not benefit financially from CSR engagement because investors do not 
appear to positively assess the company's CSR behaviour, so it is not considered in the assessment 
process of their equity assets.  
This research, therefore, is closely related to our study. However, the study by Marsat and Williams 
(2011) used two different proxies for the assessment of the company's market value (price-to-book 
and Tobin’s Q) and assessed the practice of ESG in accordance with four main pillars: 
environmental, human capital, strategic capital, and government stakeholders. The study used 
companies from the MSCI World (1,500 companies), MSCI Emerging Markets (200 companies), 
the ASX 200 (200 companies) and FTSE 350 (275 companies) from 2005 to 2009. Our study, in 
contrast, uses a different data set, Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores, and the period covered is more 
recent (from 2008-2012). We also focus solely on the worldwide data (without particular focus on, 
e.g. ASX companies) and the stock price as an indicator of value (we do include Tobin’s Q in our 
model as a control for firm performance rather than as a dependent variable). 
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De Villiers and Marques (2014) examined the effect of various levels of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure on stock prices of the largest companies in Europe. They found that 
a high level of CSR disclosure relates to a higher stock price and vice versa; this result also applies 
to a change in the level of CSR disclosure. However, Wang and Huang (2013), who investigated the 
influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the cost of equity capital of companies 
globally, found that firms with high CSR scores are significantly associated with a lower cost of 
equity capital but this does not apply in all parts of the world. 
Fulton et al. (2012) reviewed a comprehensive literature of more than 100 academic studies in the 
field of sustainable investments around the world. The study considered the impact of sustainability 
(ESG and CSR) on the cost of capital, corporate financial performance, and fund performance. 
Overall, they conclude that CSR and ESG are associated with superior risk-adjusted returns.  
Two investor perception surveys on ESG, have reported that 80 to 90 percent of investors believe 
that ESG indicators have a positive financial impact on the value of the company in the medium to 
long term (CSR Europe, 2003; Maier, 2007). Such findings suggest that the financial community 
favours companies with ESG policies. Similar sentiments were reported in the United Nations 
Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) which believes that “environmental, social, and 
corporate governance (ESG) issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios (to varying 
degrees across companies, sectors, regions, asset classes and through time)” (Balatbat et al., 2012, 
p. 2). This suggests that there is a tendency among the mainstream financial community to include 
ESG factors when evaluating the market value of the company, which is consistent with the 
practitioner claims that ESG disclosure is gaining increased importance for mainstream investors 
(Dienel, 2009). This also indicates that research in this area is increasingly becoming more 
important. 
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In general, the majority of previous studies, particularly those conducted in more recent years, have 
reported that companies’ voluntary ESG disclosure produces financial rewards. The final 
hypothesis, therefore, is: 
H4: ESG disclosure is positively associated with company market value. 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Model Specification 
The objective of this study is to investigate the value relevance of ESG disclosure. Value relevance 
tests are usually based on a return model or a price model (Barth, Beaver, & Landsman, 2001; Ota, 
2003). Both models have the same foundation, the Ohlson (1995) linear information model, but 
while some prior studies using both models have documented similar results (Bao & Chow, 1999; 
Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Sami & Zhou, 2004), others have produced conflicting results(Ely & 
Waymire, 1999; Francis & Schipper, 1999). This could be because each model is associated with 
some of its own problems such as the scale effect
9
 in the price model and the accounting 
recognition lag
10
 in the return model (Liu & Thomas, 2000; Ota, 2003). To date there has been no 
perfect solution to these problems (Ota, 2003). Despite the debate as to which is the better model 
(as discussed by Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995), this study employs the price model. Several points 
support the decision to use the price model. First, the model has been widely adopted by researchers 
(Amir & Lev, 1996; Bao & Chow, 1999; Hirschey, Richardson, & Scholz, 2001; Hughes, 2000; Lo 
& Lys, 2000; Sami & Zhou, 2004). In fact, the Peloza (2009)  review of the impact of one of the 
                                               
9 Scale effect indicates a biased prediction of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in the 
regression model, due to failure to control for the effects of scale between large and small companies. 
10
 Problems arise in the return model, which uses current earnings in the regression model, where many value-relevant 
events are not recorded in the earnings due to the accounting principles adopted by companies such as the reliability, 
objectivity, and conservatism (Ota, 2003). 
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ESG metrics, namely the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate 
financial performance (CFP), suggests that the price model dominates in this line of research for a 
number of reasons. These reasons include ease of comparing companies’ performance over time, 
inter-company, sector, and geography.  
Second, unlike the return model, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the estimated slope 
coefficient of the variable tested in the price model is unbiased (Chen et al., 2001; Kothari & 
Zimmerman, 1995). In addition, as suggested by Beisland (2009), regardless of the strength of the 
econometrics of the model specification, the chosen model should be based on the economic 
motivation of the study. This study, therefore, chooses the price model for investigating the 
relationship between companies’ market value measured by the stock prices and their ESG 
disclosure.  
Four price models are used in this study. The first three models are used to investigate the impact of 
disclosure of the individual ESG factors on market value. In the fourth model, the variable of 
interest is the aggregate ESG score. We do not include all three components in a single regression 
as there would be serious multicolinearity. The individual models are listed below: 
P = α0 + α1Env + α2BV + α3EPS + α4Tobin’s_Q + α5Debt_TA + α6Law + α7Social_Progress + 
Year effects + Industry effects + ε……………………………………………………………………..... 
(Model 1) 
 P = β0 + β1Soc + β2BV+ β3EPS + β4Tobin’s_Q + β5Debt_TA + β6Lawit + β7Social_Progress + 
Year effects + Industry effects + ε…………………....………………………………………………….. 
(Model 2) 
P = γ0 + γ1Gov + γ2BV+ γ3EPS+ γ4Tobin’s_Q + γ5Debt_TA + γ6Law + γ7Social_Progress + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε………………………………………………………..…..…………... (Model 
3) 
 P =δ0 + δ1ESG + δ2BV + δ3EPS + δ4Tobin’s_Q + δ5Debt_TA + δ6Law + δ7Social_Progress + 
Year effects + Industry effects + ε………………………………………………………………………... 
(Model 4) 
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where, 
P = Share price 
Env = Environment disclosure of firm 
Soc = Social disclosure of firm 
Gov = Governance disclosure of firm 
ESG = ESG disclosure of firm 
BV = Book value per share of firm 
EPS  = Earnings per share of firm 
Tobin’s_Q   = Tobin’s Q of firm 
Debt_TA = Total debt to total assets of firm 
Law  = a dummy variable takes the value 1 for common law country and 0 
otherwise 
Social_Prog = Social Progress index 
 
Detailed definitions of all of the variables are presented in Appendix 1. 
(Insert Appendix 1 here) 
Variables 
In testing the research question, this study employs the Collins et al. (1997) version of the Ohlson 
(1995) price model which expresses the market value of equity as a function of book value of equity 
and accounting earnings. Hence, we use three financial variables: price per share at the end of the 
financial period as the dependent variable of this study, book value (BV) at the end of the financial 
period, and earnings per share (EPS) as the measure of accounting earnings. We also include two 
other firm level financial variables in addition to the main variables included in the model. These 
variables have been identified in previous value relevance studies as impacting on company value. 
These variables are Tobin’s Q (Ammann et al., 2011; Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000; Jo & Harjoto, 
2011; King & Lenox, 2001) and total debt to total assets (McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 
1988). Tobin’s Q represents a market-based measure of profitability. Profitability has been 
identified as a driver of price (Bizcoach, 2014) and therefore it is included in our model. Total debt 
to total assets represents relevant risk factors that adversely impact price. However, companies that 
successfully utilise a degree of leverage may also have higher potential for growth, which is 
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preferred by some investors. Thus companies with high risk may also signal potential growth. 
Accordingly, we include total debt to total assets as a control variable in our models. 
The main non-financial variable in the models is ESG and its components. Positive significance for 
the coefficient of these variables would support our hypotheses. A number of cross-country value 
relevance studies have suggested that country differences have persisted even after accounting 
harmonisation (Joos & Lang, 1994), due to, for example, their capital market size (Veith & Werner, 
2010) or legal origins (Devalle, Onali, & Magarini, 2010; Hung, 2000; Veith & Werner, 2010). 
Wanderley, Lucian, Farache, and de Sousa Filho (2008), in fact, found that country of origin had a 
stronger influence than industry sector. The above studies suggest that value relevance is influenced 
by institutional factors such as political, cultural, legal and socioeconomic factors. Therefore, we 
include the common law and code law distinction to represent the legal institutional factors that are 
used to classify countries (La Porta et al., 1998).  We code common law countries as 1, and other 
countries as 0. We also include year and industry variables in our model to control for year and 
industry effects.  
To properly segregate the effect of ESG disclosure on market value from ESG performance, we also 
incorporate an ESG performance variable in our models, namely the country level Social 
Performance Index (SPI) from the Social Progress Imperative
11
. Patten (2002) argues that the 
unexpected results in some studies regarding the impact of ESG disclosure may be due to lack of 
control for ESG performance. Thus, recent studies have included control for environmental 
performance as it captures a dimension of firm risk and hence influences investor decisions, and 
ultimately market value (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, & Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2013). 
                                               
11 (http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/es/) 
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Data 
The sample for this study comprises non-financial companies listed on stock exchanges around the 
world during the five-year period 2008-2012. This particular period has been chosen because the 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores have been available on a comprehensive basis only since 2008.  
Disclosures were published prior to 2008 but the data was limited in terms of both country and 
sector coverage. Since 2008 there have been 3000 companies globally in the Bloomberg database 
with ESG. A number of studies suggest that the number of companies disclosing ESG factors has 
grown significantly in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis because of concern about 
governance (Galbreath, 2013; Karaibrahimoğlu, 2010). We sourced legal data from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook
12
 and the Social Progress Index (SPI) data from the 
Social Progress Imperative. All financial and non-financial data for the study other than Law and 
SPI was obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
Table 1. Sample 
Number of firm year observations 
 
Companies with ESG score (2008-2012) ENV SOC GOV ESG 
All companies  
   
42,576 
Less: Financial companies 
   
7,640 
Non-financial companies 
   
34,936 
Less: Countries without 5 companies in the database 
   
7,693 
Non-financial companies in 41 countries 14,881 18,018 27,206 27,243 
Less: Companies  with no SPI (3 countries) 231 318 432 432 
Non-financial companies in 38 countries 14,650 17,700 26,774 26,811 
Less: Negative BV and missing values in all main variables 800 3,850 12,924 12,961 
Number of observations                              13,850 13,850 13,850 13,850 
Less: Outliers based on Mahalanobis Distance at p (0.01) 2,395 2,395 2,395 2,395 
Final number of observations         11,455 11,455 11,455 11,455 
                                               
12 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2100.html) 
34 
 
 
The sample companies for this study were selected according to the availability of Bloomberg’s 
aggregate ESG disclosure scores, because the Bloomberg system does not allow screening on the 
basis of the individual components. There were six stages in the sampling procedure. The first stage 
selected all non-financial companies for which the Bloomberg database reported ESG disclosure 
scores for each of the firm years from 2008. Financial institutions were excluded from the sample 
because of their different nature and regulatory environment (Goodwin & Ahmed, 2006; Xiao-H. & 
Yu-Hong, 2008). In order to obtain strong regression results, only countries with at least five 
companies consistently disclosing ESG aggregate scores over the study period were included in the 
sample (La Porta et al., 1998). This resulted in 41 countries being included. However, three 
counties, Singapore, Luxembourg, and Hong Kong were subsequently removed because there is no 
data available on the Social Progress Index (SPI) for these countries
13
. 
In the next stage, all companies with negative book values and missing values for the main 
regression variables were removed
14
. In the final stage, all outliers as identified by the Mahalanobis 
Distance (MD)
15
 test were excluded.  
(Insert Appendix 2 Panel A here) 
                                               
13 Singapore and Luxembourg are not on the SPI list as these two countries do not meet the SPI data requirements. In 
order for a country to be included in the index, it must have no more than one data gap on each component. Hong Kong 
is not in the index because the SPI includes only UN recognised countries. 
14 However, we maintained the cases with missing values on the four instrumental variables (IV) used in the 2SLS 
estimation: Anti-bribery ethics policy, Ethics policy, Employee CSR training, and CSR sustainability policy. Following 
Francis et al. (2004), we replaced the missing values on the IVs by zero. 
 
15 MD is obtained by calculating the variance of each variable and the covariance between variables. More precisely, the 
MD is characterised by several features (Wicklin, 2012). Geometrically, MD is calculated by converting the data into 
standardised uncorrelated data and then computing the Euclidean distance for the converted data. To perform the MD 
test, this study uses the Hadimvo command in the STATA programme that classifies the MD value of multivariate data 
into two categories: MD below and over 25 in value. The companies scoring above 25 are omitted, as they are 
considered outliers. 
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This screening process produced 11,455 firm year observations on Environment, Social, 
Governance, and ESG. The sample companies were located in 38 countries on six geographical 
continents (Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Europe, and Oceania)
16
. Details of the 
sampling procedures are reported in Table 1. Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics on ESG 
scores.  Panel A gives a breakdown by country, panel B by year, and panel C by industry sector. 
Panel A shows that the countries with more than 1000 observations (or approximately 10% of the 
total number of observations) are China, India, Japan, and the United States (denoted by a single 
asterisk), whereas countries with less than 2% of the total number of observations are Colombia, 
Estonia, Israel, and Poland (denoted by two asterisks). Lowest maximum scores for ESG were 
Estonia (36.36) and Pakistan (38.84).  
(Insert Appendix 2 Panel B here) 
Panel B shows that the number of observations in the years 2008-2011 increased each year but there 
was a decline in 2012. Despite the decrease in the number of observations in the year 2012, the 
maximum ESG score continued to increase and the ESG maximum score occurred in 2012 (79.34). 
This suggests improved quality of reporting by companies across the world. 
(Insert Appendix 2 Panel C here) 
Panel C shows that the highest number of observations were for Industrials, 3,558 observations 
(31.09% of total observations), followed by Basic Materials, 2,332 observations (20.38%), and then 
by the two consumer industries: Non-cyclical, 1,981 observations (17:31% time), and Cyclical, 
                                               
16 (http://www.worldatlas.com/cntycont.htm) 
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1,626 observations (14:21%). The rest of the industries were under 5%, and the lowest was 
Diversified, 112 observations (0.98%) of the total observations. 
V. RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel D provides descriptive statistics of the main variables in this study. The table reports the 
mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum, and the maximum of the variables. The table 
shows that environmental scores range from 0.78 to 85.27 with mean value 23.11; social scores 
range from 3.51 to 94.74 with mean value 26.30; governance scores range from 3.57 to 85.71 with 
mean value 47.37; and the aggregate ESG scores range from 3.31 to 79.34 with mean value 29.47. 
The data indicates that, on average, the disclosure level of ESG and its individual components 
within our sample companies is at the lower end of scale but with the governance scores being, on 
average, the highest. We also report the mean and median for the financial variables (P, BV, EPS, 
Tobin’s_Q and Debt_TA) and the non-financial variables (Law and Social_Prog). 
 (Insert Panel D here) 
Panel E presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all the main variables included in the study. All 
the ESG disclosure variables are positively related to the dependent variable, P. The table also 
shows that among the ESG variables, the governance factor has the strongest positive correlation 
with price (r=0.300, p<0.001), followed by aggregate ESG (r=0.275, p<0.001), environmental 
factor (r=0.218, p<0.001) and finally, the weakest variable is the social factor (r=0.213, p<0.001).  
(Insert Panel E here) 
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Primary Tests 
This study tests four hypotheses to investigate the impact of the disclosure of the aggregate ESG 
and the individual components, the environmental, social, and governance factors on market value. 
To control for potential endogeneity of these four ESG factors, we apply Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) and apply robust regressions that compute Huber-White robust estimates of the standard 
errors to control for heteroskedasticity. We initially estimated the regressions by OLS. The 
Hausman test for endogeneity was only suggestive of endogeneity but we switched to 2SLS as the 
OLS estimates of the coefficient on book value was implausibly less than one across all four 
regressions. Furthermore, Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, and Robb (2003) suggest that good quality 
companies (particularly in terms of global reach and size) tend to disclose more non-financial 
information which ultimately affects the value of the company; thus estimates of this effect may be 
inflated or biased.  This indicates that the link between disclosure and value may not only from 
disclosure to value but also from value to disclosure. If so, then the disclosure variables are 
endogenous and estimates of the coefficients by OLS could be biased. We estimated the ESG and 
Env, Soc, and Gov variables using the following instruments: variables on the company’s anti-
bribery ethics policy, ethics policy, employee CSR training, and CSR sustainability policy, which 
we expected would affect disclosure but not value.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The results of estimation of the model by 2SLS are reported in Table 2. In contrast, to the OLS 
results, the 2SLS estimates were plausible in all regressions. Table 2 shows that the coefficients of 
ESG and its component are positive and significant with coefficient for Env = 0.0945428, p<0.001; 
Soc = 0.0649485, p<0.001; Gov = 0.1754835, p<0.001; ESG = 0.1003971, p<0.001 and the 
regressions all have a high adjusted R
2
.  More precisely, a one-point increase in the Env, Soc, Gov, 
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and ESG disclosure indexes results in ceteris paribus, price increases of  $0.09, $0.06, $0.17, and 
$0.10 respectively. From the perspective of investors, this positive coefficient throughout the ESG 
components suggests the value added of ESG disclosure on market value.  The coefficients of the 
control variables (BV, EPS, Tobin’s_Q, Debt_TA, Law, and Social_Prog) are all significant and, as 
expected, positive in sign. The results thus suggest a sound model specification.  
The governance component shows the strongest values (0.17) while social (0.06) has the lowest 
among the three components. The results obtained are consistent with prior studies in closely 
related areas such as the literature examining the economic impact of disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Those studies have found firms with CSR disclosure have positive economic 
performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) through reduced cost of equity capital  (Bachoo et al., 2013; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Hirschey et al., 2001; Plumlee et al., 2010) and increased future expected 
cash flows (Bachoo et al., 2013; Plumlee et al., 2010), which ultimately improve the overall firm 
value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011). 
(Insert Table 3 and 4 here) 
We also ran two separate 2SLS regressions, for observations within common law countries only and 
within code law countries only and the results are presented in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. 
Both Table 3 and Table 4 show that all of the coefficients of ESG and its component from both data 
sets are still positive and significant. The results show that in common law countries (Env = 
0.0956014, p<0.001; Soc = 0.0693728, p<0.001; Gov = 0.1663981, p<0.001; ESG = .0.098729, 
p<0.001), while in the code law countries (Env = 0.0626252, p<0.001; Soc = 0.0733443, p<0.001; 
Gov = 0.1928794, p<0.001; ESG = 0.091294, p<0.001).  
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The significance of the difference between the coefficients on ESG and Env, Soc, and Gov in the 
common and code law regressions was tested using the Chow test. In each case the difference was 
significant at 1% level. However, the higher value for ESG in the common law regressions is 
actually the result of a higher value for Env in the common law countries but lower coefficients on 
each of Soc and Gov.  
To further check the stability of the results for common and code law countries, we also re-ran the 
regressions after trimming observations in common law countries falling outside the range of total 
assets from USD (thousands) 10.17 to 370942.3, which is the ranges of total assets of companies 
from code law countries; this process resulted in eliminating 62 observations to retain 11,393 
observations. The results (not reported) were qualitatively similar to the data set run on 11,455 
observations, with environmental factors being stronger in common law countries and social and 
governance factors stronger in code law countries. The results thus strongly support all hypotheses 
1 to 4 and are stronger in common law countries for environmental factors while social and 
governance factors are stronger in code law countries.  
  
 
Robustness tests 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
Our robustness tests ranged from conducting rank regressions
17
 for the full set of data to regressions 
on a number of treated data sets. The results of the rank regression are (reported in Table 5) are 
similar in direction and significance but, as the variables ranked, the coefficients do not have the 
                                               
17
 Rank regression approach gives equal weight to each data point, thus reducing the extremes in the observations, 
therefore rank regression is used to ensure the results are not driven by the choice of tests in use (Sievers, Mokwa, & 
Keienburg, 2011). 
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same intrinsic meaning. The treated data sets were formed by elimination of years affected by the 
GFC, excluding 2012; by elimination of countries with only a few companies in the data set and 
countries with many companies in the data sets; and elimination of South Africa as it has strong 
mandatory requirements for disclosure. However, due to space constraints, the detailed results of 
these tests are not reported in this paper.  
The effects of the GFC were tested by running regressions excluding firstly 2008 and secondly 
2008 and 2009. In addition, considering there is a significant drop in the number of companies 
disclosing ESG globally in 2012 compared to prior periods, we also ran a regression excluding 
2012. The effect of the extremes in the number of companies in each country were tested for by 
running regressions firstly excluding Columbia, Estonia, Israel, and Poland; secondly China, India, 
Japan, and US; and thirdly by excluding both sets of countries. Finally we re-ran the regressions 
excluding South Africa from the data set. In all cases the results were qualitatively similar to those 
obtained in the main tests. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between disclosure of ESG information 
and market value using a global data set comprising companies from 38 countries over the period 
2008 to 2012. We measure ESG disclosure by Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores. Four hypotheses 
are tested using the Collins et al. (1997) version of the Ohlson (1995) model on aggregate ESG and 
the three individual components of ESG scores. We find a significant positive relationship between 
the variables of interest and market value. Thus ESG disclosure, both as the aggregate and the 
individual level, is value relevant. Our results are consistent across alternative estimation 
procedures and robustness tests. Our results have significant implications for regulators and the 
investment community because it would appear that investors could benefit from additional ESG 
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disclosure as an input to important investment decisions. However, the question of how much more 
is left open. Although the results of previous studies are mixed, our results are consistent with 
results of the more recent studies thus supporting the notion that environmental, social, and 
governance information is gaining increasing importance for investors. 
Our study contributes to the literature on value relevance of ESG disclosure. We use a new data set 
and include controls for institutional differences and ESG performance. Previous studies have 
focused on particular countries or regions; this is the first study identifying market value using stock 
price on a global data set from Bloomberg.  
There are limitations in the research design that we need to acknowledge. First, we employ global 
data and our sample companies come from a variety of different institutional settings. While we 
endeavour to control for these differences using legal origin, a number of our sample companies are 
multinationals and therefore do not reflect the operation of national boundaries in terms of legal 
traditions; thus legal origin may not be the most suitable control variables for such companies.  
Second, our study is the first global study that uses Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores as a proxy for 
ESG disclosure, and our results have not been tested against alternative data provided by alternative 
providers of ESG type scores. Comparison of results obtained across alternative data sets is work 
for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definition  
(Bloomberg Field Codes are in Parentheses) 
Variable 
Name 
Measure Description 
P Price per share  Last price for the security as provided by the exchange 
(PX_LAST).  
 
Env Environmental 
disclosure score 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
environmental disclosure as part of Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) data. The score ranges from 0.1 for companies 
that discloses minimum amount of ESG data to 100 for those that 
disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point 
is weighted in terms of importance, with data such as Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions carrying greater weight than other disclosures. 
(ENVIRONMENTAL_DISCLOSURE_SCORE) 
 
Soc Social disclosure 
score 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
social disclosure as part of Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) data. The score ranges from 0.1 for companies that discloses 
minimum amount of social data to 100 for those that disclose every 
data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in 
terms of importance, with workforce data carrying greater weight 
than other disclosures. The score is also tailored to different 
industry. In this way each company is only evaluated in terms of 
the data that is relevant to its industry sector.  
(SOCIAL_DISCLOSURE_SCORE) 
 
Gov Governance 
disclosure score 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
governance disclosure as part of Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) data. The score ranges from 0.1 for companies 
that disclose minimum amount of governance data to 100 for those 
that disclose every data point collected by Bloomberg. Each data 
point is weighted in terms of importance, with board of director’s 
data carrying greater weight than other disclosures. The score is 
also tailored to different industry sectors. In this way, each 
company is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant to its 
industry sector. (GOVERNANCE_DISCLOSURE_SCORE) 
 
ESG Environmental, 
social and 
governance 
disclosure score 
Proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent of a company's 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure. The 
score ranges from 0.1 for companies that disclose a minimum 
amount of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point 
collected by Bloomberg. The sum is a weighted average of the 
three component scores. However, it should be noted that 
Bloomberg includes values for ESG when there is no value for one 
or more of the components. We use only cases when there are 
values on each of the three components. 
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(ESG_DISCLOSURE_SCORE) 
 
BV Book value per 
share 
Total Common Equity / Number of Shares Outstanding. 
(BOOK_VAL_PER_SH) 
 
EPS Earnings per 
share  
Net Income Available to Common Shareholders divided by the 
Basic Weighted Average Shares outstanding. (IS_EPS) 
 
Tobin’s_Q Tobin’s Q (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / 
Total Assets. (TOBIN_Q_RATIO) 
 
Debt_TA Leverage Total amount of debt of an equity divided by its total assets. 
(TOT_DEBT_TO_TOT_ASSET) 
 
Law Common law 
dummy 
 
A dummy to represent country clusters using common law (1) and 
code law (0). (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2100.html) 
 
Social_ 
Prog 
Social Progress Social Progress Index offers a rich framework for measuring the 
multiple dimensions of national social progress, benchmarking 
success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing  
(http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/data/spi) 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Sample observations by country and ESG scores 
No Country 
Number of 
Observatio
n 
Percentag
e  
ENV 
Mean 
SOC 
Mean 
GOV 
Mean Mean 
ESG 
Min Max 
1 Australia 504 4.40 13.54 22.50 50.05 24.10 9.92 62.04 
2 Austria 44 0.38 26.74 34.56 44.80 32.76 11.16 54.13 
3 Belgium 33 0.29 30.09 37.63 53.30 37.24 10.33 57.02 
4 Brazil 230 2.01 30.87 57.62 42.41 39.84 5.37 72.31 
5 Canada 267 2.33 18.64 25.47 52.88 28.17 8.68 61.98 
6 Chile 43 0.38 29.07 41.12 36.79 33.70 14.46 52.07 
7 China* 1454 12.69 10.71 24.58 46.64 22.29 8.68 47.11 
8 Colombia** 11 0.10 16.98 51.67 36.52 29.67 15.7 43.39 
9 Denmark 74 0.65 22.04 28.18 42.85 28.30 8.68 58.68 
10 Estonia** 17 0.15 13.45 16.20 25.31 16.84 6.61 36.36 
11 Finland 154 1.34 33.21 35.65 53.32 38.44 10.74 79.34 
12 France 223 1.95 32.83 44.35 54.74 40.61 11.46 73.14 
13 Germany 174 1.52 28.48 35.44 40.47 32.89 9.09 73.55 
14 Greece 56 0.49 31.22 42.19 41.77 36.25 3.31 71.07 
15 India* 1204 10.51 12.68 10.36 41.76 18.86 9.5 60.74 
16 Indonesia 37 0.32 15.50 27.50 44.01 24.92 9.5 46.28 
17 Ireland 60 0.52 23.99 27.83 56.16 32.34 13.64 58.68 
18 Israel** 18 0.16 19.89 27.77 42.65 27.01 10.74 48.76 
19 Italy 112 0.98 37.99 43.73 50.31 42.19 10.33 73.55 
20 Japan* 3,585 31.30 31.42 23.25 43.56 32.30 7.44 57.85 
21 Malaysia 73 0.64 11.90 23.33 51.80 23.83 13.22 46.69 
22 Mexico 64 0.56 29.67 44.24 40.15 35.53 9.5 57.85 
23 Netherlands 110 0.96 26.34 34.94 53.62 34.68 14.46 66.53 
24 New Zealand 32 0.28 16.15 23.46 47.65 25.16 14.05 44.63 
25 Norway 77 0.67 23.29 35.97 43.80 31.02 15.7 57.85 
26 Pakistan 68 0.59 10.13 19.45 40.91 19.45 10.74 38.84 
27 Philippines 25 0.22 17.36 22.49 47.35 25.51 8.68 46.69 
28 Poland** 22 0.19 22.19 25.11 32.54 25.28 10.33 42.98 
29 Portugal 37 0.32 29.52 41.88 49.37 36.92 14.88 69.42 
30 South Africa 229 2.00 23.56 39.49 55.02 34.59 11.98 57.02 
31 South Korea 50 0.44 20.72 35.99 50.75 31.27 15.70 56.61 
32 Spain 89 0.78 39.72 51.14 49.69 44.72 10.74 77.27 
33 Sweden 160 1.40 28.15 36.80 52.25 37.76 13.64 68.60 
34 Switzerland 100 0.87 24.31 29.56 54.82 32.60 12.40 68.60 
35 Thailand 26 0.23 23.85 23.75 49.86 29.84 13.22 50.83 
36 Turkey 37 0.32 20.09 33.85 35.37 26.87 10.74 45.87 
37 UK 853 7.45 20.35 32.40 54.77 31.15 6.61 68.18 
38 US* 1,103 9.63 22.41 26.47 56.58 31.28 6,61 78.01 
  Total 11,455 100 23.10 26.29 47.37 29.47 3.31 79.34 
 
*denote countries < 2% 
** denote countries >10%        
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Panel B: Sample observations by year 
Distribution by Year 
Year 
Number of 
Observation Percentage 
ENV 
Mean 
SOC 
Mean 
GOV 
Mean Mean 
ESG 
Min Max 
2008 2,070 18.07% 22.72 24.72 44.56 28.24 0.78 68.99 
2009 2,258 19.71% 23.70 26.22 45.68 29.38 6.61 78.10 
2010 2,479 21.64% 24.02 27.19 48.31 30.39 6.61 73.55 
2011 2,735 23.88% 22.84 27.33 49.42 30.05 7.85 77.27 
2012 1,913 16.70%* 21.99 25.45 48.27 28.89 6.61 79.34 
Total 11,455 100% 23.10 26.29 47.37 29.47 3.31 79.34 
*Denote a decrease in the number of companies’ disclosing ESG factors compared to prior years. 
Panel C: Sample observations by industry 
Distribution by Industry 
Industry Sector 
Number of 
Observations Percentage 
ENV 
Mean 
SOC 
Mean 
GOV 
Mean Mean 
ESG 
Min Max 
Basic Materials 2,332 20.38 23.33 24.38 46.41 28.92 6.61 71.07 
Communications    423 3.70 18.89 27.89 49.59 28.11 7.02 57.02 
Consumer, Cyclical     1,626 14.21 23.13 25.18 47.30 29.21 7.02 73.55 
Consumer, Non-cyclical 1,981 17.31 24.78 29.45 49.23 31.53 3.31 78.10 
Diversified   112 0.98 19.39 26.42 49.12 27.93 13.64 55.37 
Energy 383 3.35 18.85 27.57 48.64 27.80 5.37 73.97 
Industrial 3,558 31.09 22.76 23.93 46.02 28.42 6.61 68.06 
Technology 557 4.86 23.10 25.64 50.19 29.97 6.61 72.73 
Utilities 483 4.22 25.44 42.07 47.97 34.57 8.68 79.34 
Total 11,445 100% 23.10 26.29 47.37 29.47 3.31 79.34 
 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of variables (N = 11,455) 
Variables P Env Soc Gov ESG BV EPS 
Tobin’s
_Q 
Debt
_TA Law 
Social_ 
Prog 
Mean 12.72 23.11 26.29 47.37 29.47 8.05 0.74 1.38 0.24 0.38 75.90 
Median 5.77 17.83 22.81 46.43 26.86 4.78 0.30 1.15 0.23 0.00 84.00 
SD 16.47 15.97 16.31 9.59 12.14 9.19 1.30 0.71 0.17 0.49 13.04 
Min 0.02 0.78 3.51 3.57 3.31 0.01 -4.61 0.34 0.00 0.00 42.00 
Max 107.35 85.27 94.74 85.71 79.34 64.83 8.58 5.83 0.82 1.00 88.00 
 
P is the price of a share of firm; Env is the environment disclosure of firm; Soc is the social 
disclosure of firm; Gov is the governance disclosure of firm; ESG is the ESG disclosure of firm; BV 
is the Book value per share of firm; EPS is the earnings per share of firm; Tobin’s_Q is the Tobin’s 
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Q of firm; Debt_TA is the  leverage of firm; Law is a dummy variable takes the value 1 for common 
law country and 0 otherwise; Social_Prog is the Social Progress of firm. 
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Panel E: Descriptive Statistics of variables (N = 11,455) 
Variable(s) P Env Soc Gov ESG BV EPS Tobin’s_Q Debt_TA Law Social_Prog 
 
P 
 
1.0000 
          
Env 0.218*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000          
Soc 0.213*** 
(0.0000) 
0.568*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000         
Gov 0.300*** 
(0.0000) 
0.277*** 
(0.0000) 
0.447*** 
(0.000) 
1.0000        
ESG 0.275*** 
(0.0000) 
0.932*** 
(0.0000) 
0.796*** 
(0.0000) 
0.519*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000       
BV 0.765*** 
(0.0000) 
0.259*** 
(0.0000) 
0.141*** 
(0.0000) 
0.152*** 
(0.0000) 
0.254*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000      
EPS 0.793*** 
(0.0000) 
0.145*** 
(0.0000) 
0.185*** 
(0.0000) 
0.252*** 
(0.0000) 
0.207*** 
(0.0000) 
0.628*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000     
Tobin’s_Q 0.228*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.125*** 
(0.0000) 
0.109*** 
(0.0000) 
0.190*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.019** 
(0.0452) 
-0.172*** 
(0.0000) 
0.157*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000    
Debt_TA -0.143** 
(0.0000) 
-0.026*** 
(0.0056) 
0.025*** 
(0.0066) 
-0.015 
(0.1184) 
-0.013 
(0.1712) 
-0.223*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.136*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.130*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000   
Law 0.077*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.261*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.149*** 
(0.0000) 
0.276*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.180*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.129*** 
(0.0000) 
0.097*** 
(0.0000) 
0.164*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.040*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
 
 
Social_Prog 0.337*** 
(0.0000) 
0.364*** 
(0.0000) 
0.209*** 
(0.0000) 
0.197*** 
(0.0000) 
0.358*** 
(0.0000) 
0.404* 
(0.0000) 
0.217*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.152*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.160**** 
(0.0000) 
-0.180*** 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
 
Note: Coefficient p-values applied two-tail 
P is the price of a share of firm; Env is the environment disclosure of firm; Soc is the social disclosure of firm; Gov is the governance disclosure of 
firm; ESG is the ESG disclosure of firm; BV is the Book value per share of firm; EPS is the earnings per share of firm; Tobin’s_Q is the Tobin’s Q 
of firm; Debt_TA is the  leverage of firm; Law is a dummy variable takes the value 1 for common law country and 0 otherwise; Social_Prog is the 
Social Progress of firms. 
 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: 2SLS regression analysis 
P = α0 + α1Env + α2BV + α3EPS + α4Tobin’s_Q + α5Debt_TA + α6Law + α7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε…………………………….……………………………………….... (Model 1) 
 P = β0 + β1Soc + β2BV+ β3EPS + β4Tobin’s_Q + β5Debt_TA + β6Lawit + β7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε…………………....……….…………...………………………….... (Model 2) 
P = γ0 + γ1Gov + γ2BV+ γ3EPS+ γ4Tobin’s_Q + γ5Debt_TA + γ6Law + γ7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε………………………..……………………………………..…..…………... 
(Model 3) 
 P =δ0 + δ1ESG + δ2BV + δ3EPS + δ4Tobin’s_Q + δ5Debt_TA + δ6Law + δ7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε……………………..……………………………………………….... (Model 
4) 
Variable(s) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Env Soc Gov ESG 
Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. 
Env .0945428 
(0.000)         
6.05          
Soc   .0649485 
(0.000)         
6.30        
Gov     .1754835   
(0.000)         
6.94      
ESG       .1003971 
(0.000) 
6.46  
BV .9914528 
(0.000)         
56.41    1.004364 
(0.000)         
57.65    .9922914   
(0.000)         
56.72    .9954737   
(0.000)         
57.11  
EPS 4.779838   
(0.000)         
36.23 4.746585  
(0.000)         
35.84    4.724398  
(0.000)         
35.82    4.755349   
(0.000)         
36.03    
Tobin’s_Q 6.426689   
(0.000)         
40.49    6.110259 
(0.000)         
37.45    5.908706 
(0.000)         
34.58    6.248647 
(0.000)         
39.39    
Debt_TA .0777114 
(0.000)         
19.30 .0768595  
(0.000)         
18.89    .0752202 
(0.000)         
18.43  .0768043 
(0.000)         
19.05   
Law 3.348039   
(0.000)         
18.43 3.060153  
(0.000)         
19.76    1.714231   
(0.000)         
8.37  3.06628 
(0.000)         
 19.73 
Social_Prog .0869779 
(0.000)         
12.03    .103198   
(0.000)         
18.94    .0863048 
(0.000)         
12.73    .0907462  
(0.000)         
13.88    
Intercept -20.39622 
(0.000)    
-41.37       -20.58472 
(0.000)    
-41.62    -24.59397  
(0.000)   
-32.66 -20.22235   
(0.000)    
 -43.14  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R
2 
0.8236  0.8230 
 
 0.8209  0.8248  
N 11,455  11,455  11,455  11,455  
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroskedasticity. P is market 
value of the firm at the end of the financial year. Env, Soc, Gov & ESG are the proprietary Bloomberg score based on the 
extent of the company's aggregate and individual components of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure.  BV is book value of the firm at the end of the financial year. EPS is earnings per share of the firm at the end 
of the financial year. Tobin’s_Q is a net result of market capitalization plus liabilities, preferred equity and minority 
interest divided by total assets at the end of that financial year. Debt_TA is a leverage variable measured by total debt 
divided by total assets at the end of the financial year. Law is a dummy variable to represent country clusters using 
common law (1) and code law (0). Social_Progr is index for measuring the multiple dimensions of national social 
progress, benchmarking success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing. N is the number of firms. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. For parsimony, the indicator variables on year and industry dummies have been included but 
the coefficients have not been reported. 
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Table 3: 2SLS Regression analysis for common law samples 
P = α0 + α1Env + α2BV + α3EPS + α4Tobin’s_Q + α5Debt_TA + α6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε…………………………………………………………..……………………..... (Model 
1) 
 P = β0 + β1Soc + β2BV+ β3EPS + β4Tobin’s_Q + β5Debt_TA + β6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε…………………....……………………………………..…………………….... (Model 
2) 
P = γ0 + γ1Gov + γ2BV+ γ3EPS+ γ4Tobin’s_Q + γ5Debt_TA + γ6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε……………………………………..…………………………..…………………………... 
(Model 3) 
 P =δ0 + δ1ESG + δ2BV + δ3EPS + δ4Tobin’s_Q + δ5Debt_TA + δ6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε…………………………………..…………….……………………………….... (Model 
4) 
Variable(s) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Env Soc Gov ESG 
Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. 
Env .0956014 
(0.000)         
3.84          
Soc   .0693728 
(0.000)         
3.88        
Gov     .1663981 
(0.000)         
5.08      
ESG       .098729 
(0.000) 
4.06  
BV 1.131072 
(0.000)         
32.10    1.146881 
(0.000)         
32.42    1.118035   
(0.000)         
31.51    1.134356   
(0.000)         
32.22  
EPS 4.770442   
(0.000)         
21.70 4.857173  
(0.000)         
22.34    4.849113 
(0.000)         
22.57    4.805808   
(0.000)         
22.07    
Tobin’s_Q 6.539589 
(0.000)         
27.61    6.511578 
(0.000)         
27.12    6.434007 
(0.000)         
26.70    6.512935 
(0.000)         
27.34    
Debt_TA .0842114 
(0.000)         
12.92 .00868504 
(0.000)         
13.05    .0836305 
(0.000)         
12.89  .0849984 
(0.000)         
13.01   
Social_Prog .0653369 
(0.000)         
  9.72    .0493959   
(0.000)         
  5.43    .0277102 
(0.000)         
  2.49    .0545844  
(0.000)         
6.83    
Intercept -15.38305 
(0.000)    
-26.03       -14.46223 
(0.000)    
-24.18    -19.27556  
(0.000)   
-18.67 -15.62013   
(0.000)    
 -25.84  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R
2 
0.8364  0.8325 
 
 0.8352  0.8358  
N 4,387  4,387  4,387  4,387  
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroskedasticity. P is market 
value of the firm at the end of the financial year. Env, Soc, Gov & ESG are the proprietary Bloomberg score based on the 
extent of the company's aggregate and individual components of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure.  BV is book value of the firm at the end of the financial year. EPS is earnings per share of the firm at the end 
of the financial year. Tobin’s_Q is a net result of market capitalization plus liabilities, preferred equity and minority 
interest divided by total assets at the end of that financial year. Debt_TA is a leverage variable measured by total debt 
divided by total assets at the end of the financial year. Social_Prog is index for measuring the multiple dimensions of 
national social progress, benchmarking success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing. N is the number of firms. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix 1. For parsimony, the indicator variables on year and industry dummies have 
been included but the coefficients have not been reported. 
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Table 4: 2SLS Regression analysis for code law samples 
P = α0 + α1Env + α2BV + α3EPS + α4Tobin’s_Q + α5Debt_TA + α6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε………………………………………………….………………………..…….... (Model 
1) 
 P = β0 + β1Soc + β2BV+ β3EPS + β4Tobin’s_Q + β5Debt_TA + β6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε…………………....………………………………………….………….…….... (Model 
2) 
P = γ0 + γ1Gov + γ2BV+ γ3EPS+ γ4Tobin’s_Q + γ5Debt_TA + γ6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε…………………………………………………………………….……....…..…………... 
(Model 3) 
 P =δ0 + δ1ESG + δ2BV + δ3EPS + δ4Tobin’s_Q + δ5Debt_TA + δ6Social_Prog + Year effects + 
Industry effects + ε……………………………………….…………………………………………....Model 4) 
Variable(s) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Env Soc Gov ESG 
Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. 
Env .0626252 
(0.000)         
3.08          
Soc   .0733443 
(0.000)         
5.70      
Gov     .1928738   
(0.000)         
5.28      
ESG       .091294 
(0.000) 
4.52  
BV .939769 
(0.000)         
46.01    .9367416 
(0.000)         
46.26    .9262743   
(0.000)         
45.07    .9363684   
(0.000)         
46.05  
EPS 4.594172 
(0.000)         
27.48 4.451208 
(0.000)         
26.44    4.44598  
(0.000)         
26.47    4.538108  
(0.000)         
27.12    
Tobin’s_Q 6.455987 
(0.000)         
26.35    6.263156 
(0.000)         
25.67    6.11598 
(0.000)         
24.60    6.361312 
(0.000)         
26.08    
Debt_TA .0704877 
(0.000)         
13.67 .0642934 
(0.000)         
12.16    .065161 
(0.000)         
12.24  .0672903 
(0.000)         
12.92   
Social_Prog .1335751 
(0.000)         
7.82    .1755673  
(0.000)         
19.34    .1760527 
(0.000)         
19.45    .1424009  
(0.000)         
11.98    
Intercept -22.14585 
(0.000)    
-19.88       -25.23074 
(0.000)    
-26.82    -31.8385  
(0.000)   
-17.90 -23.64642   
(0.000)    
 -25.93  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R
2 
0.8184  0.8201 
 
 0.8187  0.8197  
N 7,068  7,068  7,068  7,068  
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroskedasticity. P is market 
value of the firm at the end of the financial year. Env, Soc, Gov & ESG are the proprietary Bloomberg score based on the 
extent of the company's aggregate and individual components of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure.  BV is book value of the firm at the end of the financial year. EPS is earnings per share of the firm at the end 
of the financial year. Tobin’s_Q is a net result of market capitalization plus liabilities, preferred equity and minority 
interest divided by total assets at the end of that financial year. Debt_TA is a leverage variable measured by total debt 
divided by total assets at the end of the financial year. Social_Prog is index for measuring the multiple dimensions of 
national social progress, benchmarking success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing. N is the number of firms. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix 1. For parsimony, the indicator variables on year and industry dummies have 
been included but the coefficients have not been reported. 
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Table 5: Rank regression analysis 
P = α0 + α1Env + α2BV + α3EPS + α4Tobin’s_Q + α5Debt_TA + α6Law + α7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε………………………………….………………………………….... (Model 1) 
 P = β0 + β1Soc + β2BV+ β3EPS + β4Tobin’s_Q + β5Debt_TA + β6Lawit + β7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε…………………...………………………………………………….... (Model 
2) 
P = γ0 + γ1Gov + γ2BV+ γ3EPS+ γ4Tobin’s_Q + γ5Debt_TA + γ6Law + γ7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε…………………….…………….……           ……………..…..…………... 
(Model 3) 
 P =δ0 + δ1ESG + δ2BV + δ3EPS + δ4Tobin’s_Q + δ5Debt_TA + δ6Law + δ7Social_Prog + Year 
effects + Industry effects + ε………………….………………………………………………..…... (Model 
4) 
Variable(s) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Env Soc Gov ESG 
Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. Estimates 
(p value) 
z-stat. 
Env .0752616 
(0.000)         
13.13          
Soc   .0459826 
(0.000)         
8.97        
Gov     .0154294 
(0.000)         
5.22      
ESG       .0648995 
(0.000) 
11.74  
BV .8936498 
(0.000)         
196.29    .8992091 
(0.000)         
200.70    .8990421   
(0.000)         
199.55    .8948281 
(0.000)         
197.16  
EPS .0968108   
(0.000)         
21.47 .0975668  
(0.000)         
21.55    .0983918  
(0.000)         
21.67    .0974546   
(0.000)         
21.57    
Tobin’s_Q .472660 
(0.000)         
158.01    .4658544 
(0.000)         
150.13    .4680351 
(0.000)         
149.07    .4678346 
(0.000)         
154.79    
Debt_TA .0596157 
(0.000)         
22.89 .060461  
(0.000)         
22.97    .0615528 
(0.000)         
23.35  .0596181 
(0.000)         
22.84   
Law 909.4699   
(0.000)         
18.70 861.0426  
(0.000)         
17.74    693.4302   
(0.000)         
14.23  871.0523 
(0.000)         
 18.04 
Social_Prog ..0340369 
(0.000)         
15.52    .0346375   
(0.000)         
15.83    .0357361 
(0.000)         
16.05    ..033119 
(0.000)         
15.09    
Intercept -11720.67 
(0.000)    
-99.06       -11661.72 
(0.000)    
-98.13    -11457.77  
(0.000)   
-99.94 -12384.33   
(0.000)    
 -84.25  
Year effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adj.R
2 
0.9512  0.9508 
 
 0.9505  0.9511  
N 11,455  11,455  11,455  11,455  
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to heteroskedasticity. P is market 
value of the firm at the end of the financial year. Env, Soc, Gov & ESG are the proprietary Bloomberg score based on the 
extent of the company's aggregate and individual components of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
disclosure.  BV is book value of the firm at the end of the financial year. EPS is earnings per share of the firm at the end 
of the financial year. Tobin’s_Q is a net result of market capitalization plus liabilities, preferred equity and minority 
interest divided by total assets at the end of that financial year. Debt_TA is a leverage variable measured by total debt 
divided by total assets at the end of the financial year. Law is a dummy variable to represent country clusters using 
common law (1) and code law (0). Social_Prog is index for measuring the multiple dimensions of national social 
progress, benchmarking success, and catalyzing greater human wellbeing. N is the number of firms. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. For parsimony, the indicator variables on year and industry dummies have been included but 
the coefficients have not been reported. All financial data (except ratios) are expressed in thousands of US dollars.  
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